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Abstract 
This working paper is concerned with the informal institutionalization of contacts between European 
institutions and religious organizations launched by Jacques Delors and its aftermath: the formal 
institutionalization of these contacts started by Jose Manuel Barroso. It was with Jacques Delors that 
the relationship between religion and the European project gained in importance. As president of the 
European Commission he recognised the social role of European religions by inviting them to the 
project “A Soul for Europe”, which aimed to find a more robust source of legitimacy for the European 
project. Subsequently, I describe the incorporation of Art. 17 in to the Lisbon Treaty obliging dialogue 
with churches, religious and philosophical organizations, which is in my opinion a direct aftermath of 
the “Soul for Europe”. It is my argument in this paper that the “religious” project of Jacques Delors in 
many respects failed, as he did not find a meaningful role for religion in European integration in the 
way he was hoping for, nor did he find the robust source of legitimacy for the European project.  
Keywords 
Religion, secularism, Christianity, European integration, Jacques Delors
  1 
 
If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe,  
to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. 
Jacques Delors
1 
 
We can identify two approaches to institutionalization of the relationship between religion and politics 
in the European Union. The first can be understood as a series of formal and informal contacts 
between churches and the European Commission concentrating on what could be of mutual interest: 
fighting poverty, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, the future of EU enlargement. The other 
approach is linked to the constitutionalization of Europe, which is more about setting the limits of the 
Community by asserting “who we are” and “what holds us together”. In this paper I will concentrate 
on the first assertion. 
The protagonist of this paper is Jacques Delors - a politician who has arguably had the most 
significant impact on the European Union as we know it. It was he who drove the launch of the Single 
Market, the single currency project and the cohesion policies, to name only a few fundamental 
enterprises in today’s EU. Jacques Delors also personifies different strands present at the heart of the 
history of European integration – a follower of French personalists, a socialist, a practicing Catholic 
and a defender of French laicité. These make him a complex personality who contains all that is 
important to understand the EU in terms of its willingness (and failure) to engage with religious 
matters. What is crucial about Delors is the fact that he was the only politician of the European 
Communities who meaningfully posed a question on the role of religion in the European project and 
tried to give an answer to this question.  
In this paper I will firstly sketch briefly the biography of Jacques Delors, as this might help us 
understand his political positions in the fundamental periods of European integration. Then, I will 
concentrate on the "Soul for Europe" project – one of the very few EU initiatives dealing with religion. 
Subsequently, I will briefly describe the incorporation of Art. 17 into the Lisbon Treaty obliging 
dialogue with churches, religious and philosophical organizations, which is in my opinion a direct 
aftermath of the “Soul for Europe”.  
It is my argument in this paper that the “religious” project of Jacques Delors in many respects 
failed. Certainly, Delors did not find a meaningful role for religion in European integration in the way 
he was hoping for. The project did, however, bring a concrete result – the practice of consultation 
between religious leaders and the EU leaders which was formalized as the Art. 17 of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Thus, Delors is the European politician who had the most significant impact on the emergence 
of the European agnostic form of secularism. 
Christian democrat in disguise 
Jacques Delors is perhaps the most paradoxical personality in the history of European integration: a 
Catholic defending laicité, a leftist who perpetuated the most free-market oriented period of European 
integration, a life-long member of the socialist party who has been closer to the ideology of Christian-
democracy than most life-long Christian democrats.  
He was raised in a rather poor Catholic family, as he puts it: “I wasn’t born with a silver spoon in 
my mouth.” As one of the members of his cabinet told me, he was “a guy from a humble background 
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who does everything to be better than the products of French grands écoles.”2 He is known as a person 
who is "driven", "knows every dossier he is working on in great detail", and also a person who was not 
easy to work with – “after a stressful meeting, he often used to kick the cat.”3  
An important inspiration for his engagement in Europe was the encounter with personalists linked 
to “Esprit” – the magazine in which he first became familiar with Maritain and Mounier, the key 
French personalist thinkers: 
I didn’t meet either of them, but I used to be around Esprit magazine, including writing articles as 
early as the 1950s, and communitarian personalism is still my line (Delors & Deschamps 2009, 
p.4). 
He has rather a developed view on what personalism is: 
[I]t is time to go back to our ideal, to be fully conscious of it, through each of our actions in the 
field of politics, economics, social and cultural affairs, let us continue to investigate what can 
enable each man, each woman to flourish, in full awareness not only of his or her rights, but also 
of their duties vis-à-vis others and society as a whole. Let us strive to constantly re-establish 
human collectivities in which the individual is able to live and develop, and to grow through 
exchanges and cooperation with others (Delors 1989). 
His devotion to the idea of Europe was strongly linked with his engagement with personalism and with 
Jacques Maritain's thought, as well as being influenced by the French “founding father” of the 
European project, Robert Schuman: 
Yes, I had read up on all that in my spare time. I’d read it all and it had made a great impression on 
me, especially Maritain (…). It was always my underlying inspiration, so to speak. So, over and 
above events which I wasn’t always capable of evaluating properly, I wasn’t in a position of 
responsibility, but I was perfectly sensitive to it, and especially from the European point of view, 
to Maritain (…). I have to say that that was the moment when I realized that Robert Schuman’s 
appeal — excuse me for saying this, people will say it’s Christian – was of a high spiritual value. 
Not just political but spiritual. And that was the day when I said: ‘There you are, your path is 
mapped out’ (…). I think there is a link between that and my commitment to Europe (Delors & 
Deschamps 2009, p.3). 
He started his political activities as a member of Christian democratic Mouvement Republican 
Populaire, but according to Jérôme Vignon, he quickly became disenchanted with the party and 
became an activist within Christian democratic worker’s unions (which later got secularized). Much 
later, in 1974, he joined the socialist party, a natural move given Delors long-standing sense that he 
was a person of the left: 
[Étienne Deschamps] And how were you able to put this communitarian personalism into practice 
in the active political life you then embarked on? 
[Jacques Delors] The Left. There’s this saying by a Swiss writer that ‘Nature is on the right, man is 
on the Left’. That’s all. I think that believing in man means being on the Left. After that you can 
then start defining it in different ways. There are people in the present majority who think like me. 
But that’s it, that’s my point of view, I believe in man with my eyes open (Delors & Deschamps 
2009, p.4). 
There are different opinions on how Delors’ religiosity translated into political action. People who 
worked with him were convinced that religiosity played a significant role in his political life: 
You didn't have to work long with Delors to discover that he was a devoted Christian. He was not 
a doctrinaire Christian, though.
4
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According to one of his advisors, he even went to see the nuncio of Belgium and asked him what 
could be done for Europe from the Catholic point of view. The nuncio suggested Delors to start a 
network of prayers in the Benedictine monasteries.
5
 And indeed he did so – the network is called 
Groupe Chevetogne (the name comes from the monastery close to Namur in Belgium).
6
 This 
movement was a clear reference to the monastic history of Europe - one of the fundaments of 
European culture, especially in the Middle Ages. It is rather surprising that a French socialist engaged 
so openly in an initiative like this and also shows that the dividing lines between Christianity and the 
European project are more blurred than one might suppose. 
Delors and the Pope: Mutual disappointment 
Delors’ religiosity did not lead to his close relationship with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He 
was often at odds with those Christians (especially Catholics) who required religious visibility. This is 
probably the reason why his relationship with Pope John Paul II was rather a difficult one. They met 
for the first time in May 1985, and, as Jérôme Vignon recalls it, both were very much disappointed 
after the meeting. Delors probably wanted more support for his big European endeavours; John Paul II 
expected a clearer, more explicit reference in the European project to its Christian roots.  
Delors was upset that the Pope did not see his efforts to change the fate of the continent and 
thought of the project as of economic nature. As he later said:  
[L]e Vatican considère la construction européenne comme un phénomène purement matérialiste et 
économiciste. Le Vatican n’est-il pas conscient qu’au sein des responsables européens certains 
luttent pour essayer de préserver, contre vents et marées, une dimension sociale a l’économie, ainsi 
qu’une dimension sociale à l’économie, ainsi qu’une dimension éthique, voire spirituelle?
7
 
Differences between the Pope and President Delors were significant. They inherited very different 
visions of the bond between Catholicism and identity. For the Pope, Catholicism was the primary 
identity marker – a defining feature for the political reality, even if he endorsed the post-Vaticanum II 
notion of the separation between church and state. One of the reasons for such a clear position was, 
among others, the communist idea of the atheist state, which John Paul II experienced in Poland. 
Delors, who grew up in France, was strongly influenced by the heritage of 1905 law and the 
general consensus on the strict separation between Church and state (the French Catholic Church came 
to terms with the separation only after the decades of culture wars). Also, his experience was marked 
by the failure of the Catholic Church in France in the time of General Petain, which according to 
David White was an experience that influenced his vision of the relationship between religion and 
politics. This fascist experience was also crucial for the flourishing of left-wing personalism after 
World War II in France
8
 that was so close to Delors' heart. Personalism was also well known to John 
Paul II, who as a young priest visited Paris in late 1940s and presumably had contacts with 
personalists. Yet, by the 1980s his position on the public role of Christianity was in many respects 
different than the one represented by the inheritors of French personalist tradition (especially those on 
the left). 
It is not surprising that Delors and John Paul II took very different stances in the constitutional 
debate. John Paul II was very much in favour of the symbolic presence of Christianity in the 
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Constitution, while for Delors it was a second range issue. He was more interested in the dialogue 
between Commission and churches on the most important issues from his perspective: the fight against 
poverty, the enlargement of the EC, the question of unemployment. He did not see Christianity as an 
identity marker of Europe.  
It is remarkable that Delors was a proponent of Turkish membership in the EU. As Bérengère 
Massignon demonstrates, this was in line with his understanding of what Europe should be: 
L’argumentaire proposé par Jacques Delors en faveur de l’entrée de la Turquie se rattache aussi au 
modèle de l’identité contrat, avec le souhait de rattacher le projet européen a des valeurs 
universelles, mais tirées de l’expérience de la construction communautaire (…). L’âme de 
l’Europe, c’est son projet qui trouve justement ses racines dans la volonté de dépasser les conflits 
de passe. Pour Jacques Delors, l’Union reste une communauté de valeurs (non spécifiquement 
européennes certes), mais pourtant au cœur du projet européen depuis les Pères fondateurs, comme 
la paix, la démocratie… L’Union, alors, pourrait être un modèle de diffusion des valeurs 
démocratiques et de droits de l’homme (Massignon 2007, p.282). 
It would be interesting to compare the personalism of founding fathers (like Alcido de Gasperi or 
Robert Schuman) with its more contemporary versions. One thing seems to be clear: the personalists 
of the 1940s and 1950s did not see the need to make out of Christianity “an identity marker”, because 
the European imaginary was still very much Christian. The fact that contemporary personalists like 
Delors or Van Rompuy (van Rompuy 2009) are rather far from seeing Christianity as a distinctive 
trait of the European project has different meaning in Europe which is largely a post-Christian entity. 
The second difference concerns the attitude towards liberalism: today’s personalists are much less 
anti-liberal, which would be unthinkable for thinkers like Emmanuel Mounier. To Mounier, liberalism 
was perhaps worse than fascism. As Tony Judt put it: “fascism might be the immediate threat, but 
liberalism was the true enemy” (Judt 1992, p. 17).  
The intensification of integration 
Delors became president of the European Commission in 1985. This was a time when the political will 
to further liberalize trade arrangements between members of the European Communities and remove 
barriers to the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and labour between member countries 
was at its high point. In 1985, Delors found a Community in the split between the advanced 
constitutional federal order and an intergovernmental political order. The constitutional legal order of 
the Communities was the result of two decades of “integration through law” which almost 
unnoticeably changed the legal order of the continent by strengthening the legal basis of the 
communities, above all through the doctrine of direct effect and the supremacy of European over 
national law. Legal federalization was not, however, accompanied by a political one, as the 
Luxembourg Accord was still in place. This left each Member State with veto power over Community 
legislation affecting “its vital interest”; in practice, this meant a general right of veto for every 
Member State (Weiler 2001).  
After the first enlargements, consensual decision making became more and more difficult to 
achieve. Therefore, there was an idea to switch to Quantified Majority Voting in issues concerning the 
single market. This was adopted by the states as a minor revision of the Treaty of Rome. Most heads 
of state thought that it is just a simple change that would not change the community's equilibrium and 
sold it to the public in their countries as such. However, it became clear that after the adoption of the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, the European Communities were moving on to a track of faster 
integration.  
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There is little doubt that much of this was due to Delors and his personality. He managed to bring 
Europe on the path of intense political and economic integration
9
 for the first time since the 1960s. 
The SEA marked the beginning of his mandate. He used the pro-European momentum to intensify the 
efforts to create a more integrated Europe in both political and economic terms. In the 1992 White 
Paper he outlined a path towards a completion of the internal market, proposing simple legislative 
steps to achieve this goal. This supposed ideological "neutrality" marked most of revolutionary steps 
that the Delors Commission proposed. The same can be said about the Economic and Monetary Union 
(Delors programme) and the political union.  
There was another aspect to Delors economic and political reforms – the project of a social Europe. 
It was Delors who pushed for social legislation on the European level, trying to strengthen the position 
of workers in the Member States. He wanted thus to include workers in the growth produced by the 
expansion of the Single Market. This was also rationale behind his other achievement, the 
development of structural funds that were designed to finance the underdeveloped members of the 
Community and compensate their weaker performance in the single market. The deployment of 
structural funds played a big role also after the subsequent enlargements and might be seen as one of 
the most significant examples of the manifestation of European solidarity. 
The 1992 programme resulted in a new treaty – the Treaty of Maastricht – which followed the 
impetus given by less spectacular SEA. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union in 
place of the European Communities (a step which will be discussed in detail below), the establishment 
of the European Monetary Union (leading to the European single currency), the development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and strengthening of the role of the Parliament. Maastricht 
moved Europe towards a centralized political and economic federation. 
Delors’ vision of Europe differed from the one that he managed to achieve. One of the most 
significant failures was arguably his vision of “social Europe” which would balance the “single market 
Europe” that he successfully brought about. He managed, however, to bring about the political union 
which was incorporated into the treaties. The problem is that the political union proved to be incapable 
of creating a bond between the European institutions and European citizens. Political federalization of 
Europe lacked popular support, and the ambiguity of European societies has thus appeared as a 
constant theme in European integration in the last twenty-five years. 
Union or Community? 
Perhaps the most significant symbolic change which happened during the presidency of Delors was 
the change of the name of the polity-in-the-making. Instead of the European Communities, it became 
the European Union. According to the member of his cabinet, this went against Jacques Delors and his 
insistence on the "community method", instead of the "intergovernmental method" (which was 
symbolized by the Union and the need for unanimity):  
Most heads of state and government who participated in the Intergovernmental Conference that 
took place in 1991–92 was against extending the “community approach”, the third and second 
pillar. On that point Delors had lost because he was in favour of such an extension. It was finally 
decided that for matters relevant to foreign and security policy, the decision process should be 
framed with the intergovernmental procedure. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty clearly signalled 
that a new political entity was born out of the combination of three pillars, but only the first under 
“community method”, should no longer be called a Community. Delors not only disliked the word 
“union”, but this word illustrates an option against his own preference.
10
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This strong dislike shows a certain division within Delors: he understood the importance of 
"community", he emphasised the social aspects, he was attached to subsidiarity,
11
 but at the same time 
he created a market-oriented, centralized polity which seemed to go in the direction of a super-state. 
Maybe because of this duality, Delors wanted to pursue a new project that would involve churches in 
his work. Maybe this is why he thought that there is a need to give this project a soul, because – as he 
famously said – “you cannot fall in love with the Single Market”. 
Soul for Europe 
Delors thought that the European Union cannot be based solely on market and supranational 
bureaucracy. This is why he started to meet regularly with the representatives of Christian churches, 
seeking their support in the transforming Europe: 
We are in effect at a crossroads in the history of European construction. 1992 is a turning point 
(…). The Maastricht summit marked the end of the economic phase of European construction – 
what has been described as the ‘semi-automatic’ development of the EC, based on drive towards 
the Common Market (…). Believe me, we won’t succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal 
expertise or economic know-how. It is impossible to put the potential of Maastricht into practice 
without a breath of air. If the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe, to give 
it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up. This is why I want to revive the intellectual and 
spiritual debate on Europe. I invite churches to participate actively in it. The debate must be free 
and open. We don’t want to control it; it is a democratic discussion, not to be monopolized by 
technocrats. I would like to create a meeting place, a space for free discussion open to men and 
women of spirituality, to believers and non-believers, scientists and artists (Leustean 2012, p.4). 
The meeting was one of a series of meetings with religious leaders organized under the name of “A 
Soul for Europe” and coordinated by the Forward Studies Unit in the European Commission (directly 
reporting to the president) and managed by two people: Marc Luycx and Jérôme Vignon.  
The project consisted of numerous meetings between the president of the Commission and 
religious leaders (Catholic and Protestant, above all – though Delors did not want to close it off to 
other religions). At times Delors wanted to discuss with them the current shape of the European 
Communities, but usually they were devoted to important social problems, such as unemployment, 
agriculture, migration, the problem enlargement and deepening of the EU. It seems clear that the idea 
was to discuss the issues important from the perspective of European institutions, not the other way 
around.  
These meetings were continued by Delors’ successor, Jacques Santer, but were in fact blocked by 
the socialist president of the European Commission Romano Prodi. Nevertheless, dialogue with 
churches remained institutionally linked with the Forward Studies Unit (changed then to Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors, now it is the European Political Strategy Centre).  
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 “Another guiding principle of the Maastricht Treaty is the principle of subsidiarity, whereby – to put it briefly – a higher 
level of power must be empowered to deal only with those matters which are better dealt with at that level, let’s say (…). 
I think the Protestants said it before the Catholics, to be historically accurate. I did a great deal of work on it. And 
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contradictions.” (Delors & Deschamps 2009) 
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It is not a coincidence that Delors decided to name this project like he did. He spoke of the 
European soul on several occasions. The idea of soul is clearly linked with the European philosophical 
and spiritual tradition. It was "invented" in ancient Greece – the concept of soul can be found in 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophic systems and was then transferred to Judaic and then Christian 
theology – where it constituted a basic feature of the human person and the main source of its dignity. 
The soul has a place in the history of European culture and Delors was well aware of that. He was also 
aware that there is a need to create a bond between the European societies and the European 
institutions – he thought that churches should play a prime role in this endeavour – at least regarding 
some groups of European societies. 
Did he succeed? It would be very difficult to find arguments for such a thesis. The European 
project did not become less technocratic and the regular contact with churches  did not change the 
economic character of the European Union. There is, however, one lasting element of the Delorsian 
dialogue with churches: the institutionalization of dialogue between churches and European 
institutions.  
The Churches Article 
Paradoxically, Jacques Delors was against the institutionalization of dialogue with churches (as an heir 
to French laicité he favoured less official form of contacts between religion and politics), but the 
presidents of the European Commission who followed him did institutionalize the dialogue. The 
formal step was taken by Jose Manuel Barroso in 2005, when he started to organize regular meetings 
with the churches and humanist organizations. The article was transferred (as large parts of the TCE) 
to the Lisbon Treaty which was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and entered 
into force on 1 December 2009. Thus, Delors set in motion a logic which led to the institutionalization 
of the dialogue. 
The authors of the Treaty thus decided to incorporate a special article obliging European 
institutions to conduct a dialogue with the churches and non-religious organizations: 
1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and 
religious associations or communities in the Member States.  
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical
12
 and non-
confessional organizations.  
3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organizations. 
The first format of these contacts established by Barroso is the annual formal high-level meeting event 
with representatives of different religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism), which is 
devoted each time to a different topic: terrorism, fundamental rights, climate change, economic crisis, 
poverty (often linked with the "European Year of" various things). There is one high-level meeting 
with the representatives of churches and one with the non-confessional leaders. The EU is represented 
by the president of the European Commission (now it’s first vice-president Timmermans), the 
president of the European Council and the president of the European Parliament. The second format is 
a dialogue seminar organized by churches and religious organizations mostly on the issues where the 
Commission has competences (for detailed data see (Houston 2013).  
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The meetings and all the other forms of dialogue were organized by a special work force in the 
European Commission which used to be called the Forward Studies Unit (founded by Jacques Delors), 
then Group of Policy Advisors (GOPA), then Bureau of European Policy Advisors (then BEPA). All 
these units were responsible directly under the president of the European Commission. Under 
president Jean-Claude Juncker, however, this has changed. The dialogue with religious and 
philosophical organizations is now a competence of the first vice-president of the European 
Commission, Frans Timmermans, and is located in the DG Justice, which changes a bit the importance 
of the question of dialogue. 
The dialogue since Jose Manuel Barroso has been run by Katharina von Schnurbein
13
. Although the 
level of the officials responsible is high, one cannot avoid the impression that the salience of the 
dialogue for the European Commission is not very high. Also, the format of the annual high-level 
meetings seems to be problematic from the perspective of both sides. On the one hand, the 
Commission has difficulties in finding representative partners (apart from the Catholic Church, which 
has a clear hierarchy). Therefore, some representatives of, for example, Muslim or Protestant 
communities seem to be chosen randomly. On the other hand, the insights from the meetings do not 
seem to be meaningful. As one of their participants told me, “you can write the press release before the 
meeting”. 
 
 
Pope Francis meeting the representatives of COMECE (17.05.2017). Source: www.comece.eu 
The issue of representativeness is, as mentioned, not a problem only with regard to Catholicism. The 
church is represented by the nuncio (diplomatic representative of the Vatican) and COMECE 
(Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences), the equivalent of the Council of the European Union at 
the church level. As for “high politics”, it is obviously the competence of the popes and Vatican’s 
secretaries of state, and contacts between the leaders of the EU and popes are regular.  
It is already a much bigger problem regarding the Protestant and Orthodox churches. They are 
represented in Brussels by the CEC (Conference of European Churches), an organization established 
in 1959 (with a secretariat since 1967) that brings together various Protestant and Orthodox churches 
(the idea to bring the Orthodox churches came about to bring together churches from both sides of the 
iron curtain). However, this produces difficulties in coming to a single opinion within the CEC, as the 
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position of Protestant churches (which is far from united itself) is often very different from the 
position of the Orthodox churches, especially regarding sexual morality. 
Another problematic issue regarding the dialogue is the question of the balance between religious 
and non-religious organizations. While it is more or less clear who is represented by the representation 
of churches (i.e. the members of their churches), it is not entirely clear who is represented by the non-
religious organizations. As Katharina von Schnurbein notes it, these organizations often claim to 
represent the majorities in many European states who are not practicing any religion (or simply do not 
believe in God). It is, however, of course very difficult as the “humanist organizations” are most often 
linked with the tradition of masonry, which is a very specific form of non-belief. The question of how 
to engage with philosophical beliefs of non-believers seems still in need to be answered.
14
 
Despite criticisms, Jose Manuel Barroso reported being happy with the results Art. 17 brought 
about: 
It’s a good exercise. Dialogue with various churches, but also those who have no religion. Some 
people ask me what is the concrete result of these meetings? Look, the very fact that we have this 
dialogue – this in itself is very important. I absolutely don’t agree with European extreme 
secularists. Religion is a part of our societies, politics should not try to eradicate it. The political 
institutions should be secular of course, but they should have intelligence and openness to 
recognize the importance of religion. Radical secularists are so similar to the dogmatism of some 
religions that they criticize. They create a kind of a church of secularism. This leads us to an issue 
of identity. Identities in the contemporary Europe cannot be understood in an exclusive way – 
because then we’re doomed to unresolvable conflicts.
15
  
This excerpt from my interview with Jose Manuel Barroso might serve as a good exemplification of 
the state of minds of Brussels elites with regard to religion – most of them sincerely believe in the 
need of dialogue with religious organizations and genuinely reject the strict ideological secularism. 
They, however, do not look for religious insights, but rather believe in the need to accommodate 
certain forms of religiosity in the European public sphere.  
  
                                                     
14 There is an impression that the Christian churches benefit from the dialogue much more than “philosophical 
organizations”. This discrepancy was criticized by the European Ombudsman, who issued a decision criticizing the 
European Commission in the case submitted by the European Humanist Federation. The federation complained about the 
refusal of the European Commission to organize a dialogue seminar on issue of religious tax exemptions. The 
Ombudsman suggested that it “constitutes an instance of maladministration” (European Ombudsman 2013). It is thus not 
surprising that article 17 is “a reason for concern” for the humanists (Pollock 2013, p.122). 
15
 Interview with Jose Manuel Barroso, 29.04.2016, Princeton. 
Michał Matlak 
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